My Article on Conflict of Laws and Cultural Property

I have posted on SSRN the final version of my paper titled How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow of Illicit Cultural Property, 32 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 111.

Pictured here is a Byzantine mosaic from the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, similar to the mosaics taken from Northern Cyprus which gave rise to the Goldberg suit. The Seventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals upheld the default—and problematic for cultural property disputes—lex situs rule in holding “Indiana law and rules govern every aspect of this action, from the statute of limitations issues through the application of the substantive law of replevin.” The trial court had noted that although Switzerland was the location of the wrongful activity, it bore little connection to the cause of action. None of the parties or important actors was Swiss; the mosaics had never been in the stream of commerce in Switzerland; and they had only been on Swiss soil for four days. The jurisdiction with the closest connection to the objects was Cyprus, not Indiana. After all, the mosaics had been firmly fixed to the church for over 1400 years. Although it would therefore make sense to give concessions in the law to jurisdictions such as Cyprus, courts have shown a hesitancy to apply the law of the source nation, or lex originis.

Here is the abstract:


The International trade and transfer of art and antiquities faces problems because nations have erected very different rules with respect to movable property. All nations forbid theft, however most cultural property disputes involve an original owner and a subsequent good faith possessor. Different jurisdictions have chosen to allocate rights and responsibilities between these two relative innocents in very different ways. Disharmony in the law is seldom a good thing, but in the realm of cultural property it can be particularly damaging to the interests of nations, museums, individuals, and our collective cultural heritage. The lack of harmony ensures no overarching policy choices will be furthered, which prevents parties from anticipating legal outcomes and giving substance to policies.

This article explores the default conflict of law rules which are applied to cultural property, and shows how the lex situs rule exploits the various legal rules which apply to art and antiquities. It challenges the lofty position enjoyed by the lex situs rule and proposes a radical reform of the default choice of law analysis. By employing the law of the Nation of Origin or lex originis courts can ensure the jurisdiction with the most tangible connection to an object enjoys the benefit of applying its legal rules to a given dispute. This will not only ensure the security of art and antiquities transactions, but impart much-needed transparency into the cultural property trade, and finally will decrease the theft and illegal excavation of art and antiquities.

The article begins by presenting some examples of recent disputes, and the problems they present for the law and cultural heritage policy. Section II describes the fundamental difficulty of adjudicating claims between two relative innocents, and the disharmony which has resulted as different jurisdictions have resolved this conundrum in very different ways. Section III lays out the ways in which private international law impacts art and antiquities disputes. Section IV analyzes the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, the most recent attempt to harmonize the law affecting cultural property. Section V proposes a radical reform of the choice of law enquiry taken by courts.

Keywords: art, antiquities, private international law, conflict of laws, international law, lex originis, lex situs, renvoi, art theft, antiquities, cultural heritage, cultural property

I’d be delighted to hear any reactions to the work at derek.fincham “at” gmail.com.

Questions or Comments? Email me at derek.fincham@gmail.com

Case Note in the International Journal of Cultural Property

On SSRN I’ve just posted my case note Rejecting Renvoi for Movable Cultural Property: The Islamic Republic of Iran V. Denyse Berend 14 Int’l J. Cultural Prop. Issue 01, pp 111-120 You can download the article here. Here is the abstract:

In Iran v. Berend, the High Court in London had occasion to revisit one of the most enduring problems of private international law and cultural property. Effective regulation of the illicit market in cultural property is extremely difficult, because many measures aimed at stemming the illicit trade actually contribute to the black market. Courts in both England and the United States have shown that they are prepared to use criminal laws to convict persons involved in the illegal trade in antiquities exported in violation of foreign patrimony laws. As a result, much cultural property policy debate in recent years has focused on the extent to which the criminal law can impact the illicit trade. The extent to which national ownership declarations can be used in civil disputes remains less clear.

I would especially like to thank the Case Notes Editor Robert Paterson of the University of British Columbia for all his help editing the note. If there are any comments to the piece, I would love to hear them.

Questions or Comments? Email me at derek.fincham@gmail.com

No renvoi in Iran v. Berend (UPDATE)

The opinion in Iran v. Berend [2007] EWHC 132 (QB) has been released.

The dispute involved a fragment of an Achaemenid limestone relief from the city of Persepolis. This image, which I took from an organization called Cultural Heritage News, compares Berend’s limestone, with the site in Persepolis. It makes for pretty damning evidence. The Cultural Heritage News agency is operated out of Iran, and I’m not sure where they get their funding, and their articles on this dispute strike me as a bit one-sided. Nevertheless, they did provide a good background to the dispute.

Denyse Berend purchased the limestone fragment in 1974. As the opinion states, “It was sold to her through an agent at a New York auction in October 1974.” The object has been on display in Berend’s Paris apartment since the purchase. Iran brought suit against Berend when she tried to sell it at an auction at Christie’s London in 2005.

The dispute ultimately came down to which nation’s law should apply to the dispute, France or Iran. Under Iranian law, the object would be returned, but under French law, the 30 year statute of limitations period had elapsed, and Berend would have clear title. Two conflicting private international law principles were at play here. First, is the lex situs doctrine which holds that the law of the location of the object at the time of the transaction should apply. Under that rule, French law would apply.

Iran wanted Justice Eady to apply the rule of renvoi, which would have dictated that Iranian law would apply. The renvoi choice of law principle occurs whenever a court is called upon to interpret the law of another nation. It has been applied to wills and some family law, though never to movable objects.

No English court has applied renvoi to movables, and it seams Justice Eady was reluctant to do the same in this case. According to Wikipedia, a recent Australian High court decision applied the rule in Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd [2005] HCA 54 (29 September 2005). In that case, the Australian High Court applied the rule in a tort case. The plaintiff injured herself in an apartment in China. The apartment was overseen by her husband’s employer, an Australian company. The court applied the law of Australia, because both parties to the suit were Australian. Applying the Australian court’s logic to this case, it doesn’t seem likely that the principle of renvoi would be applicable, and even in the Australian case, there seems to be a great deal of criticism of the decision.

Eady was understandably reluctant to go out on a limb and apply the principle in this case. As he said, “English law has held for many years, in order partly to achieve consistency and certainty, that where movble property is concerned title should be determined by the lex situs of the property at the time when the disputed title is said to have been acquired.”

I wonder if Iran may choose to appeal the decision. In any event, though the limestone relief seems to have clearly come from Persepolis, Iran has no legal right to the object under English law. On a side note, there may be damages stemming from the grant of the original injunction against Berend’s attempted auction of the object at Christies in London. One wonders why Iran did not pursue its claims in 1974, when the object was first sold. I wonder as well whether the 2005 auction had taken place in Christie’s New York, rather than London, if the more generous statute of limitations provision would have allowed for a much different result.

UPDATE:

Over at the Journal of Private International Law’s blog, conflictoflaws.net, Martin George has gone into some more detail on the choice of law implications at play in the decision. He rightly points out that an English court adopting a renvoi rule for movable property would have caused a lot of headaches. However, he misses the cultural policy implications: the limestone relief was almost certainly taken from Persepolis. The relief came from what is essentially the Persian Acropolis. In the event the ruling stands (which seems most likely) look for Iran to press for the return of the relief based on ethical principles. In any event, the potential sum the relief may bring at an auction seem quite diminished. I wonder if Berend and Iran may try to work out some kind of a settlement. It seems likely that quite a few potential purchasers have been scared away by the Iranian claims.

Postscript:

I have noticed a lot of folks are still interested in this case. For a much better and complex account of the decision you can download my case note published by the International Journal of Cultural Property here.

Questions or Comments? Email me at derek.fincham@gmail.com